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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS
UNDER FIFRA: THE EROSION OF A DEFENSE
Valerie Watnick*
With the growth of federal regulation in the last century, federal preemption of
state law has been an evolving issue in the area of toxic torts litigation. The
preemption doctrine occupies a particularly prominent place in the area of pes-
ticide-related litigation as the judiciary has struggled to decide what, if any,
tort claims are preempted by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act of 1972 ("FIFRA "), the federal statute governing the sale and labeling of
pesticides in the United States. In Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv. Inc., 22 Cal.
4th 316, 93 Cal. Rptr2d 36 (2000), a case heard by the Supreme Court of
California, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") took the position
that federal preemption of pesticide-related tort claims is largely improper under
FIFRA. The EPA's advocacy represented a major departure from the U.S. gov-
ernment's long silence with regard to federal preemption of tort claims and
struck a huge blow to the pesticide industries'future ability to use preemption
effectively as a defense. Although the Supreme Court of California did not
agree with the EPA's position in Etcheverry, a significant number of other re-
cent courts have adopted the EPA's position, holding that FIFRA does not
preempt most or any state tort claims. These court decisions indicate that judi-
cial support for a broad view of federal preemption under FIFRA is eroding.
This article analyzes the history and considers the future of federal preemption
of state tort claims pursuant to FIFRA. The article urges finally that the courts
are not clear about the extent to which Congress intended to preempt common
law tort claims pursuant to FIFRA; that FIFRA should be interpreted narrowly
to provide for little federal preemption; and that, at the very least, Congress
should clarify this issue.
INTRODUCTION
With the growth of federal regulation in the last century,'
federal preemption of state law has been an evolving issue in the
area of toxic torts litigation. The preemption doctrine occupies a
* Assistant Professor of Law at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City
University of New York. B.A. cum laude 1985, Bucknell University; J.D. 1988, Cornell Law
School. The author dedicates this article to her husband, Donald Wamick.
1. This growth in federal regulatory power originally stemmed from New Deal initia-
tives and later from the growth in the number and role of federal agencies. See Mary Lee A.
Howarth, Comment, Preemption and Punitive Damages: Conflict Continues Under F/FRA, 136 U.
PA. L. Rav. 1301, 1301 (1988).
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particularly prominent place in the area of pesticide-related
litigation as the judiciary has struggled to decide what, if any, tort
claims are preempted by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act of 1972 ("FIFRA") , the federal statute
governing the sale and labeling of pesticides in the United
States.3 In Etcheverry v. Ti-Ag Service, Inc.,4 a case heard by the
Supreme Court of California, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") first took the position 5 that federal preemption
of pesticide-related tort claims is largely improper under FIFRA.
The EPA's advocacy6 represented a major departure from the
U.S. government's long silence with regard to federal
preemption of tort claims and struck a huge blow to the pesticide
industries' future ability to use preemption effectively as a
defense.7
Although the Supreme Court of California did not agree with
the EPA's position in Etcheverry,s several other courts have
adopted the EPA's position, holding that FIFRA does not pre-
empt state tort claims. 9 These decisions indicate that judicial
2. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of
1972 is codified at: 7 U.S.C. § 13 6- 1 3 7 y.
3. See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
4. Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
5. Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Etcheverry (No. S072524) (filed on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Environment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department ofJustice) [hereinaf-
ter EPA Etcheverry Brief]. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text regarding EPA's
prior statements concerning its review of pesticides.
6. See generally EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5.
7. See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
8. Etcheverry, 993 P.2d at 375. Numerous essays and articles have been written on the
recent litigation in the California state courts concerning the preemption defense under
FIFRA. See Lawrence S. Ebner, California Supreme Court Repudiates Federal Government Position
on Pesticide Tort Preemption, PRODUCT LIABILITy L. AND STRATEGY, Apr. 2000, at 1; Lawrence
S. Ebner, The California Supreme Court Weighs In on FIFRA Preemption, 15 Toxics L. REP. 627
(2000); John H. Kazanjian & Kathleen Lennon, Preemption Defense Cracks in Pesticide Exposure
Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 8, 1999, at 9; Public Citizen Files California Supreme Court Brief Supporting
Crop Damage Plaintiff ANDREWS Toxic CHEMS. LITIG. REP., Apr. 5, 1999, at 8; see also infra
notes 25-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of an informational notice the EPA
issued in 1996 on the subject. The court held instead that to the extent plaintiff's claims
were even loosely related to the failure of the product label, which was approved by the EPA
pursuant to federal law, they were preempted under FIFRA Etcheverry, 993 P.2d at 371-72.
9. See infra Parts III.B.2-3; see, e.g., Sleath v. W. Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16
P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001); Geye v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 32
S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App. 2000). But see Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744 (Neb. 2002)
(holding that bystander state tort claims were preempted by FIFRA). Other courts have
carved out numerous exceptions to the preemption doctrine as it relates to pesticide-
related claims. See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
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support for a broad view of federal preemption ° under FIFRA is
eroding. '
This article analyzes the history and considers the future of
federal preemption of state tort claims pursuant to FIFRA. Part I
of the article discusses the legislative history of FIFRA and
FIFRA's preemption provision. Part II of the article discusses the
ideological basis for the doctrine of federal preemption, as well
as the judiciary's general treatment of preemption in pesticide-
related cases beginning in the 1970's at the time of FIFRA's
major re-enactment. 12 Part III discusses the current state of the
case law, paying particular attention to a recent preemption
decision by the United States Supreme Court and the EPA's
arguments in Etcheverry 3 Part IV of the article argues that the
courts are not clear about the extent to which Congress intended
to preempt common law tort claims pursuant to FIFRA,' 4 that
FIFRA should be interpreted narrowly to provide for little federal
preemption, and that Congress should clarify this issue.
I. FIFRA: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. FIFRA Legislative Framework and Preemption Provision
1. The Legislative Framework-FIFRA is the federal statute regu-
lating the sale and use of pesticides in the United States.'6
Originally passed as a labeling statute in 1947,16 the statute has
10. Brian Wolfman & Douglas L. Stevick, Preempting the Preemption Defense, TRIAL, July
1998, at 54, 54.
11. See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
12. William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federal-
ism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975).
13. See generally EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5.
14. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984). But see Etcheverry, 993 P.2d at 371-72.
15. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000). Throughout this article, the term pesticide will be used to
include herbicides, fungicides, insecticides, and rodenticides used to kill, repel or control
weeds, pests or vermin of any sort. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
defines pesticide to mean any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling or mitigating any pest, and any substance or mixture of substances
intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desiccant, excepting substances which are
considered new animal drugs, as that term is defined pursuant to federal regulations. 7
U.S.C. § 136(u) (2000).
16. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat.
163 (1947).
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been strengthened to address concerns about health and the envi-
ronment and has evolved into a comprehensive federal statute
7
designed to give the EPA regulatory authority over the entire process
of marketing and selling pesticides.18 FIFRA requires that before a
pesticide may be sold in the United States, it must be registered with
the EPA. 19 A pesticide may be registered with the EPA for general use
if the EPA determines that when used as expected, it will not gener-
ally cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment., 20 The
term "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" is defined
by the statute as "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment,
taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs
and benefits of the use of any pesticide."2 ' The purpose of the EPA
registration process is to balance risk versus utility; but the process
does not guarantee a product's safety or efficacy.22 In fact, the EPA
itself has stated that "no pesticide can be considered 'safe' ,,23 and
17. 7 U.S.C. § 136-13 7 y (2000); see S. REP. No. 92-838, at 4 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993.
18. Stephen D. Otero, Note, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: ReconcilingCipollone's
Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of Federalism, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 783, 785 (1995).
19. See generally Valerie Watnick, Who's Minding the Schools: Toward Least Toxic Methods of Pest
Control in Our Nation's Schools, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 73 (1996).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1) (B).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). A pesticide may be registered with the EPA for restricted use if
the pesticide, when applied normally in accordance with its directions for use, may generally
cause, without additional regulatory restrictions, unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment, including injury to the applicator. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1) (C).
22. The current regulatory scheme is particularly inept at guaranteeing the safety of pes-
ticides for children. See generally Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in
Pesticide Regulation and the EPA's Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection Act's Safeguards for Chil-
dren, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1315, 1351 n.261 (1999). Children are particularly susceptible to the
effects of such toxic agents in the environment. Watnick, supra note 19, at 77-81.
23. DENNIS VACCO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF LAW, PESTICIDES IN
SCHOOLS: REDUCING THE RISKS 3 (1996) (quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, APRIL
1986, NONAGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES: RISKS AND REGULATIONS, GAO/RCED-86-97, at 4); see
WELLNESS LETTER (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Cal.), Aug. 1, 1995, at 3.
In an introduction written to Rachel Carson's ground-breaking book, Silent Spring, former
Vice President Al Gore concluded:
[FIFRA, tihe statute that regulates pesticides, fungicides, and rodenticides sets far looser
standards than those that regulate food and drugs, and Congress intentionally made
them more difficult to enforce. In setting safe levels of a pesticide, the government takes
into account not only its toxicity but also the economic benefit it provides. This dubious
process pits increased agricultural production (which might be obtained otherwise)
against potential increases in cancer and neurological disease. Moreover, the process for
removing a hazardous pesticide from the market generally takes five to ten years. New
pesticides, even if they are very toxic, can win approval if they work just marginally bet-
ter than existing ones.... The present system is a Faustian bargain-we get short-term
gain at the expense of long-term tragedy .... Essentially, what we have inherited is a sys-
tem of laws and loopholes, deadlines and delays, facades that barely disguise a wholesale
failure of policy.
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all pesticides are "associated with some risk of harm to human
health or the environment."
2 4
Additionally, the EPA limited the purview of its own review un-
der the statute in 1996. Prior to the filing of its brief amicus curiae
in Etcheverry, the EPA issued Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 96-4,
a document written by EPA's general counsel, stating that it be-
lieved many courts had been mistaken about the agency's role in
regulating the labeling of pesticides.25 In the Notice, the EPA in-
dicated that it does not evaluate a pesticide's efficacy prior to
approval and that it waived such a review because it believed that
state tort law would ensure the accuracy of statements regarding
a product's efficacy.26 The EPA stated:
This notice explains EPA procedures in approving pesticide
labels.... EPA is issuing this notice at this time to correct a
misunderstanding regarding the FIFRA label approval
process and efficacy claims that is reflected in a series of
court decisions concerning the preemptive effect of
FIFRA .... EPA has acted under this authority to waive, by
regulation, data requirements as to efficacy issues for all
agricultural pesticide [sic] .... [A]griculture [sic] pesticides
are 'effectively regulated by the marketplace,' and... waiving
review of the efficacy of agricultural pesticides in the
registration process would enable the Agency to focus of
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING xxi (1963) (introduction by former Vice President Al Gore);
see also T COLBURN, OUR STOLEN FUTURE (1996) (theorizing that synthetic chemicals mimick-
ing hormones are threatening our fertility, intelligence and basic survival, also with an
introduction by former Vice President Al Gore).
24. DENNIS VACCO, ATrORNEY GENERAL OF N.Y. STATE, HOME AND GARDEN PESTICIDES:
QUESTIONS AND ANSwERS ABOUT SAFETY AND ALTERNATIVES (1996); see R. ABRAMS, ATrONEy
GENERAL, N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF L., LAwN CARE PESTICIDES: A GUIDE FORACTION 4 (undated).
One major problem in EPA's risk assessment is that it does not fully consider the effects of inert
ingredients in pesticides. ELIOT SPrTZER, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LAW, THE SECRET INGREDIENTS IN
PESTICIDES: REDUCING THE RISK 1, 5 (2000). These ingredients, often comprising the bulk of the
product, are not even listed on the product label and have been found to be just as toxic, if not
more so, than their active counterparts. 1d; seeJohn Carlucci, Note, Reforming The Law on Pesticides,
14 VA. ENvTL. LJ. 189, 205 (1994); Wamick, supra note 22, at 1351 n.261.
25. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDE REGULATION
(PR) NOTICE 964 (June 3, 1996) [hereinafter PR NOTICE 96-4].
26. Id. at 1-2; see also infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text. Pursuant to FIFRA, the EPA
is permitted to review pesticides for efficacy, but has chosen not to do so. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (5)
(2000).
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[sic] its 'primary mandate under FIFRA': investigating 'the
health and safety aspects of pesticides.'
2 7
The EPA thus pointed to private legal action for damages as
one factor that would ensure that pesticide manufacturers sold
an efficacious product, noting that "pesticide producers are
aware that they are potentially subject to damage suits by the user
community if their products prove ineffective in actual use.
28
2. The Federal Preemption Provision Under FIFRA-Notably,
FIFRA contains an express provision regarding federal preemp-
tion. This provision is contained in section 136v and is entitled
"Authority of States. '' 9 Subsection 136v(a) contains the following
language: "A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide ... but only if and to the extent the regula-
tion does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this
subchapter. 0 0 Additionally, subsection 136v(b) reads: "Such State
shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for label-
ing or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter., 3' Thus, section 136v appears to both pre-
empt state authority and give the states some authority to
regulate the sale and use of pesticides. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has said that section 136v "acts to ensure that the States
could continue to regulate use and sales"2 of pesticides, the
Court has not spoken specifically as to whether section 136v pre-
empts state common law tort claims. Not surprisingly, given the
ambiguity inherent in the section, the lower courts have grappled
with section 136v, trying to decide the extent to which Congress
intended to preempt pesticide-related common law tort claims. 4
27. PR NOTICE 96-4, at 1-2 (citations omitted); see infra notes 255-56 and accompanying
text.
28. PR NOTicE 96-4, at 2 (quoting 47 Fed. Reg. 40659, 40661 (Sept. 15, 1982)). The Notice
appears to be specifically designed to correct the public's misconception of the EPA as an insurer
of product efficacy in connection with its role in the pesticide registration process. See id.
29. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).
32. See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
33. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614 (1991).
34. See infra Parts III.B.2-3.
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B. Legislative History
While the legislative history of FIFRA is not conclusive as to
whether Congress intended to preempt35 common law tort claims
under FIFRA, it does give some insight into the issue. Prior to
FIFRA's passage in 1972, Congress held twenty-five days of hear-
ings and issued reports from four different committees.
At the committee hearings, what was to become section 136v of
FIFRA was extensively discussed. 38 EPA's General Counsel testified
on behalf of the administration, which drafted the bill that would
become the 1972 Amendments to FIFRA:
I would like to emphasize that the States have played a major
and continuing role in pesticide regulation.... We wish to
encourage and not supplant these efforts by providing that
States may prohibit the use of a particular pesticide within
their jurisdiction even if the pesticide is registered under the
Federal authority. States thus are not precluded from impos-
ing stricter standards or added requirements, but they may
not permit any sale or use of a pesticide which is prohibited
under the authority of the Act.
39
The EPA's General Counsel further testified that "[t]he bill does
not affect tort liability."4 0 No member of Congress or any other
person objected to this interpretation of the bill that would be-
come FIFRA. These statements, while not absolutely dispositive on
35. Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762 (JFK), 1986 WL 14925, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 1986).
36. Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the House Comm. On Agric., 92nd Cong.
(1971); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Agric. Re-
search of the Sen. Comm. On Agric. and Forestry, 92nd Cong. (1971); Federal Enfironmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the Subconm. On Agric. Research of the Sen. Comm On Ag. and For-
estry, 92nd Cong. (1972); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Envt. of the House Comm. on Commey, 92nd Cong. (1972).
37. H.R REP. No. 92-511 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-838 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN.
3993, 3993; S. REP. No. 92-838 (Supplemental Report) (1972); S. REP. No. 92-970 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3993, 4092; H.R. CONF. REP. 92-1540, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3993,
4130.
38. See, e.g., Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the House Comm. On Ag-
ric., 92nd Cong. (1971).
39. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 24-25 (quoting statement of EPA General
Counsel John Quarles, in Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the House Comm.
On Agric., 92nd Cong. at 8 (1971)).
40. Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the House Comm. On Agic., 92nd
Cong. at 42 (1971); see also EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 28.
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the issue, do not appear to evince a congressional intent to eradi-
cate all or even most common law tort actions under FIFRA.
Similarly, the committee reports issued prior to the passage of
FIFRA do not seem to indicate that Congress intended to abrogate
private tort actions under FIFRA. 4' Rather, they indicate that Con-
gress intended the states to continue to regulate the sale and use
of pesticides.42 For example, the Report by the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry noted that enforcement of FIFRA would be
strengthened by "authorizing cooperation with States." 3 Similarly,
the Senate Commerce Committee Report also contained specific
sections on state and local regulatory power." The section entitled
"Authority of States" indicated that the intent of the bill was "to
leave to the States and local governments the authority to impose
stricter regulations on pesticides [sic] use than that [sic] required
under the Act.,
45
The Senate Commerce Committee Report also contained a spe-
cific section entitled "Authority of Local Governments to Regulate
the Use of Pesticides."4 6 This section noted that local governments
should be given the authority to regulate the sale or use of a pesti-
cide beyond the requirements imposed by state and federal
authorities under the pending legislative scheme.47 While the
Commerce Committee Report specifically noted that state and lo-
cal governments would be preempted from imposing labeling or
packaging requirements different from those required under
48FIFRA, it definitively allowed local governments to prohibit or
entirely restrict the sale or use of a pesticide from a locality. 9
41. See H.R. REP. No. 92-511 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-838 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3993; S. REP. No. 92-838 (Supplemental Report) (1972); S. REP. No. 92-
970 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4092; H.R. CON. REP. 92-1540 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3993, 4130.
42. S. REP. No. 92-838 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3993, 3993; S. REP. No.
92-970 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4092. Committee reports also indicate
that the main purpose of FIFRA was to more fully regulate pesticides to provide greater
protection for man and the environment. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-970, at 27 (1972).
43. S. REP. No. 92-838, at 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3994.
44. S. REP. No. 92-970, at 27, 44 (1972).
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 27, 44.
49. Id. at 27. This Senate Commerce Committee Report can be contrasted with the
Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee Report which stated that local governments
should not regulate pesticides in any manner. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 609-10 (1991) (citing S. REP. No. 92-838, at 16 (1972)). In Wisconsin Public Intervenor,
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that these two committees, those with primary responsi-
bility for FIFRA, never resolved their differences of opinion concerning whether the bill
preempted local regulation of pesticides. Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 610.
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Finally, as with any congressional action, one can presume that
Congress knew the current state of the law. ° At the time of FIFRA's
passage, tort actions against pesticide producers were a common-
place occurrence." In this context, neither the Senate Commerce
Committee Report nor any other congressional report indicates
that the purpose of FIFRA was to eradicate all or even most com-
mon law tort actions. 52 Instead, the committee reports, the
committee hearings, and other legislative history together evi-
dence a congressional willingness to allow states to continue to
regulate pesticide use and sale-even to impose stricter require-
ments on such activities-as long as such regulation did not
directly contravene federal labeling requirements.
53
II. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF PREEMPTION AND THE
HISTORY OF PESTICIDE-RELATED LITIGATION
A. The Ideological Basis of the Preemption Doctrine
The doctrine of federal preemption is grounded in the Suprem-
acy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 4 which provides that the laws
of the United States, and hence federal law, "shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 5 The preemption doctrine
thus allocates regulatory power between the federal and state
governments, allowing federal law to trump state law when
applicable.56 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that preemption
can occur by express statutory command of Congress or by impli-
cation via the occupation doctrine or the conflict of interest
doctrine. 57 While these two theories of preemption have guided
the United States Supreme Court to varying degrees, the Court has
50. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 19-23 (citing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v.
Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988) (court may presume that Congress is familiar with the rele-
vant legal landscape when it acts)).
51. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 20.
52. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (noting that it is diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would remove all recourse for plaintiffs injured by illegal
conduct without comment).
53. S. REP. No. 92-970, at 44 (1972).
54. Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the
Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 1233, 1233 (1985).
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
56. Martin, supra note 54, at 1233.
57. See Howarth, supra note 1, at 1310-11.
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continuously viewed the intent of Congress as the "touchstone" for
all preemption analysis.8 Indeed, the Court has said: "[c]on-
sideration of issues under the Supremacy Clause 'starts with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not
to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.' "9 The high Court has also repeat-
edly stated that there is a "strong presumption against pre-
eruption 60
Pursuant to the occupation doctrine, preemption occurs where
Congress has so pervasively dominated an area of law that there is
61no room left for state regulation. When Congress "occupies a
field," the states are prohibited from regulating that area of law.62
Preemption by occupation can exist in two ways. There may be an
63express command of Congress, in which case a court may still
have to decide exactly what is preempted. In other cases, the intent
to occupy an area of regulation may be less clear and a court must
decide whether federal preemption should be implied in the first
instance and then decide the extent of federal preemption.64 Dis-
cerning the existence and the extent of federal preemption by
occupation is a vexing process; indeed, one commentator has said
that the occupation of the field doctrine poses two distinct difficul-
ties: first determining what the field is, and then determining
whether or not it is occupied.65 The more pervasive and compre-
hensive the legislative scheme, the more likely Congress intended
66to occupy the area of the law to the exclusion of state regulation.
Alternatively, federal preemption can result where state law con-
67flicts with federal law. In such cases, Congress can expressly
recognize the conflict or the potential for conflict and prohibit the• 68
conflicting state regulation. In other cases, it is impossible to
58. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see Betsy J. Grey, Make
Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 564 (1997).
59. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
60. See, e.g., id. at 523.
61. SeeHowarth, supra note 1, at 1310.
62. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 69, 72-73 (1988) (discussing federal preemption by "occupying the field").
63. One example of this type of express preemption can be found in the federal regu-
lation of employee benefit plans pursuant to ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security
Program, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
64. SeeHowarth, supra note 1, at 1311.
65. Wolfson, supra note 62, at 72.
66. See Bratton, supra note 12, at 625.
67. SeeHowarth, supra note 1, at 1311-12.
68. Id. at 1312.
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carry out the directives of both the state and federal law. In such a
case, Congress is said to have impliedly preempted state regula-
tion.69 In still other cases, preemption is even more subtle:
although it is possible to comply with both state and federal law, a
conflict exists between the purpose or the function of the federal• 70
scheme and the state regulation. In this case as well, Congress will
also be said to have impliedly preempted state law by stating an
overriding federal purpose that is different than the state's pur-
pose in regulating.
While the Supreme Court has used the occupation doctrine and
the conflict of interest doctrine to guide its analysis, the applica-
tion of federal preemption doctrine to determine the existence
and extent of preemption is largely a matter of the interpretation
of congressional intent.7 As Justice Black noted: "no classification
scheme is applied consistently: '[N]one of these expressions pro-
vides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional
yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula.' ,
72
The shifting nature of this "formula," and hence the effect of
the federal preemption doctrine to prohibit various forms of state
regulation, can thus be attributed, at least in part, to the changing
ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court as its members have changed
and the Court's resulting collective view as to the matter being
regulated has changed7 3 Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has
been more willing to preempt state law in an area traditionally of
federal concern, and less willing to preempt state law premised on
74an exercise of traditional police power.
While the U.S. Constitution reserves to the states all those pow-
ers not specifically given to the federal government, 75 a state's
regulatory power7 6 will vary, depending on the interpretation and
69. Id.
70. See id.; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
71. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
72. Richard Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 187, 192 n.23 (1993) (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
73. See Howarth, supra note 1, at 1313; Bratton, supra note 12, at 639-51.
74. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); Martin, supra note 54, at 1234; Celeste Marie Steen, Note,
FIFRA's Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving Genetically Engineered Pesticides, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 763, 771 (1996).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
76. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
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application of the federal preemption doctrine." In turn, the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the federal
preemption doctrine has depended on its view of federalism as
well as the proper extent of state autonomy and power in the area
under regulation.78
B. Federal Preemption in Pesticide-Related Litigation
In 1972, at the time of FIFRA's re-enactment, 79 great deference
to state police power was the norm; courts often balanced state and
federal interests, looking for an actual conflict of law before
preempting state regulation.80 In the 1980's, deference to state
regulation continued, as evidenced by Pacific Gas & Electric Co."'
and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,2 two decisions in which the
Supreme Court deferred to state regulation. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state moratorium on
the building of nuclear power plants, even where one of the
primary objectives of the Atomic Energy Act was the promotion of
nuclear power 8 and where, through the Act, Congress had
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety regulation. 4 The Court
held that California's regulation of nuclear power plants was an
economic regulation, not a safety statute, and that Congress had
left sufficient authority for the states to stop or slow the
815construction of a nuclear power plant for economic reasons.
Similarly, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. involved the Atomic
Energy Act, 6 which gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
exclusive authority to regulate safety matters in connection with
nuclear power plants. 87 Appellant was injured in a nuclear poweraccident and sued the plant owner pursuant to state tort law.8 The
77. Martin, supra note 54, at 1233.
78. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
79. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947), amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Con-
trol Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 3 6 -1 3 6y
(2000)).
80. See Bratton, supra note 12, at 639-41.
81. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983).
82. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
83. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 221.
84. Id. at 210.
85. Id. at 222.
86. The Atomic Energy Act was known as the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011
(2000).
87. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 239.
88. Id. at 239.
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U.S. Supreme Court allowed a state law award of punitive damages
to the injured worker, even where the corporate plant owner had
complied with all of the Atomic Energy Act's safety directives.89 The
Supreme Court held that the Act would only preempt punitive
damage awards under state law where it would be physically
impossible to comply with both the state and federal law, or where
exposure to such damages would frustrate the purpose of the
federal law.90
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not specifically face the
preemption issue under FIFRA in the 1980's, two federal courts
reached important decisions in Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co.91 and
in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,92 allowing awards of damages to
plaintiffs in state failure to warn suits under FIFRA.9'
In Ferebee, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that FIFRA did not preempt a damage award in a failure to warn
case involving the pesticide Paraquat.94 Chevron, the defendant
manufacturer, argued that because the EPA had approved the label
on Paraquat, the court could not now award damages to a plaintiff
based on the inadequacy of that label. 95 The circuit court rejected
Chevron's argument, reasoning that requiring the maker of the
product to pay damages was not the type of "direct regulatory
command" contemplated in FIFRA's prohibition against state-
imposed additional labeling requirements. 96 The court reasoned
that a state could impose tort remedies and that this would not
amount to a state regulation of the product label.97 If a pesticide
manufacturer was faced with a damage award or multiple awards, it
could then assess the viability of continuing to sell the product as
labeled or could decide to alter its label to limit further liability.9
The court noted:
89. Id.
90. Id. at 256.
91. Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762 (JFK), 1986 W.L. 14925 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 1986).
92. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 E2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984).
93. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
94. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
95. Id. at 1540.
96. Id. at 1541.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Ferebee court also noted that the purposes of FIFRA and of state tort law,
while compatible, might be "distinct:"
FIFRA aims at ensuring that, from a cost-benefit point of view, [a pesticide] as la-
belled [sic] does not produce 'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.'
State tort law, in contrast, may have broader compensatory goals; conceivably, a label
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Imposition of such a dual obligation upon a manufacturer is
permissible under the Act. While FIFRA does not allow states
directly to impose additional labelling [sic] requirements, the
Act clearly allows states to impose more stringent constraints
on the use of EPA-approved pesticides than those imposed by
the EPA.99
In Wilson v. Chevron, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York also considered the availability of a state law damage
award under FIFRA and held that such actions were not preempted
under FIFRA.'00 In Wilson, plaintiff's husband died as a result of
dermal exposure to the herbicide "OPCL," manufactured by defen-
dant Chevron."" Plaintiff sought punitive damages against Chevron
pursuant to state law.102 Plaintiff alleged that Chevron's warning la-
bel, even though approved by the EPA, was inadequate in that it did
not warn that death could result from dermal exposure to the herbi-
cide.1 03 Defendant moved for summary judgment, urging that FIFRA
preempted plaintiff's action for failure to warn.0 4 The Wilson court
first noted that the burden of proving federal preemption rests
squarely with the party seeking it.l05 Relying on Silkwood,1°6 the court
held that federal preemption would only occur where it would be
"impossible to comply with both state and federal law" or where
"state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." ° 7 Where, as here, an award of
punitive damages in a state tort action would further FIFRA's pur-
poses of "protecting citizens from the hazards of modern pesticides,"
a state tort action would not in any way "stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of FIFRA's purposes." 0 8 Additionally, the Wilson
may be inadequate under state law if that label, while sufficient under a cost-benefit
standard, nonetheless fails to warn against any significant risk. In addition, even if the
ultimate purposes of federal and state law in this area are the same, a state (acting
through its jurors) may assign distinct weight to the elements which go into deter-
mining whether a substance as labeled is of sufficient net benefit as to warrant its
use.... Assignment of values to such 'soft' variables as human health is among the
most difficult tasks faced in a regulatory society....
Id. at 1540 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 1541 (citing 7 U.S.C. 136(v) (a) (1972)).
100. Wilson, 1986 W.L. 14925, at *5.
101. Id. at*1.
102. Id. at*1, *5.
103. Id. at *1, *2, *5.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *6.
106. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).
107. Wilson, 1986 W.L. 14925, at *5 (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248).
108. Id.
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court noted it would not be impossible to comply with both state
and federal law, and thus, plaintiff's common law claim was not pre-
empted on this basis either.'09
Decisions made in the post-Ferebee and Wilson era often held that
FIFRA did not prohibit state common law tort actions even if they
were related to a failure to warn. ° These courts adopted the Ferebee
court's analysis, reasoning that a manufacturer could comply with
FIFRA and still be subject to liability under state tort law for failureIll
to warn. The argument followed that, if, at some point, the manu-
facturer believed that it should change its label to avoid further tort
liability, it was free to do So.112
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court finally decided a case involving
FIFRA preemption in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier.
1 1 3
Although the opinion is instructive because it provides a glimpse
into the Court's view of the legislative history and the statutory
language of FIFRA, the issue in the case was not federal preemption
of tort claims generally, but rather, the validity of a local pesticide-
related ordinance from the town of Casey, Wisconsin.11 4 The
ordinance required a town permit for applications of pesticides to
public lands and for all aerial applications of pesticides.'1 5 A pesticide
user brought a declaratory judgment action, claiming that the local
ordinance was preempted by state and federal law." 6 As a general
matter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that preemption by occupation
does not exist under FIFRA" 7 and that the local regulation at issue
did not conflict with FIFRA so as to cause preemption."'
The Court discussed extensively the issue of local versus state
regulation of pesticides pursuant to FIFRA," 9 holding that the statu-
tory language in FIFRA was "wholly inadequate" to convey an intent
to expressly preempt local regulation of pesticides.' The Court also
held that nothing in the legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to preempt all local authority to regulate pesticides under
FIFRA, and that thus the local regulation would not be preempted.'
109. Id. at *6.
110. See, e.g., Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
111. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541.
112. Id.
113. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
114. Id. at 602.
115. Id. at 602-03.
116. Id. at 603.
117. Id. at 612.
118. Id. at 614.
119. Id. at 606-13.
120. Id. at 607.
121. Id. at 603, 609.
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In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that the FIFRA preemption
provision was silent as to the authority of a local government to
regulate, but that "[t] he exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be
inferred from the express authorization to the 'State[s]' because





The Supreme Court thus appears to limit the extent of federal
preemption under FIFRA, at least as to local regulation. 12 3 In so
doing, however, the Court calls the local governments "political
subdivisions" of the state governments that FIFRA "empowers."
124
With this statement, the Court appears to agree that the state
governments retain some significant authority to regulate under
FIFRA.
125
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its next important
preemption decision, striking a huge blow to state regulatory power
concerning the tobacco industry in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
2 6
Cipollone involved a female cigarette smoker named Rose Cipollone
who sued Liggett Group in tort when she became ill from smoking
cigarettes.12 7 The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed both the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act") and its
predecessor statute, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965 (the "1965 Act") to determine whether either the 1969
Act or the 1965 Act preempted the common law tort claims of
petitioner, the son of Rose Cipollone.
128
The 1965 Act included a preemption provision which stated: "No
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by [this Act], shall be required on any cigarette package."'2
The 1969 Act included a stronger provision: "No requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
122. Id. at 608. The Court noted that political subdivisions of the state are properly
treated as agencies for exercising state power. Id. The Court stated: "[p]roperly read, the
statutory language tilts in favor of local regulation." Id. at 607.
123. Id. at 606-13.
124. Id. at 608.
125. Id.; see supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
126. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Cipollone, Wisconsin Public In-
tervenor, 501 U.S. at 614, and one other case to follow, Medtronic v. Lohr, Inc., 518 U.S. 470
(1996), provide the current guidance on the preemption doctrine. This latter decision and
its effect on pesticide related litigation is discussed in Part III of the article. See infra Part
III.A.
127. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509.
128. Id. at 508-09.
129. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000) (empha-
sis added).
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packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this [Act].''3°
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that both the 1965 Act and the
1969 Act contained express preemption provisions, and held that
where this is the case, it is not appropriate to infer congressional in-
tent to preempt state law.13 ' The Court held further that the 1965 Act
did not preempt petitioner's common law claims because Congress
had passed the Act mainly to create labeling uniformity s and had
only intended to supercede positive enactments of state and local
governments, thus preserving state tort claims.
133
In contrast, the Court held that the broader language of the 1969
Act-specifically the fact that the 1969 Act barred "requirement[s]
or prohibition[s] based on smoking and health"134-- indicated a
congressional intent to ban all state requirements regarding adver-
tising or promotion of cigarettes, including state common law claims
if they could be said to impose such requirements. 13 5 The Court thus
held that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969136 swept
broadly to preempt all state tort actions that stemmed from a failure
to warn of the dangers of cigarettes.1 7 The Court rejected peti-
tioner's argument that common law actions do not impose
"requirements or prohibitions."'" Rather, the Court noted that
"'regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of dam-
ages as through some form of preventive relief,"' and that "'It]he
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.'"
39
In the wake of this federal preemption analysis by the U.S.
Supreme Court, many lower courts interpreting FIFRA's preemption
provision held that FIFRA, too, swept broadly,140 and that Congress
had similarly intended to bar state tort actions that were at all related
130. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) (empha-
sis added).
131. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. The Supreme Court has stated that an express preemp-
tion provision supports an inference that Congress did not intend to preempt other
matters, but does not entirely foreclose implied preemption. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 283, 288 (1995).
132. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519.
133. Id. at 518-19.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
135. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
137. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522; see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
138. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
139. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gammon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959)).
140. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.
WINTrER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
to the labeling of a pesticide product pursuant to FIFRA.14 ' These
142 144courts rejected the Wilson 43 and Ferebeel4 decisions which had
concluded that congressional intent to preempt common law
claims related to pesticide labeling could not be inferred from
FIFRA'4 5 Instead, many of the federal judicial circuits began to
take a broad view of federal preemption under FIFRA.
146
Thus, for example in King v. E.L Dupont Nemours & Co., 147 the
plaintiffs claimed to have been harmed by chemical herbicides
they had sprayed while working as employees of the State of
Maine. 48 Plaintiffs sued the defendants for negligence in that they
failed to warn plaintiffs of the dangers of the pesticides with which
plaintiffs worked. 9 Plaintiffs also sued defendants in strict liability,
alleging that defendants had sold products that were unreasonably
dangerous because they lacked an adequate warning.' 50 The First
Circuit held that in light of Cipollone, FIFRA's language, barring
states from imposing "any requirement" for labeling or packaging
would sweep broadly to prohibit all of plaintiffs' state tort claims.'
The court held that because FIFRA "mandates the preemption of
the establishment or enforcement or any common law duty that
would impose a labeling requirement inconsistent with those es-
tablished by the Act, or the EPA's regulations, Plaintiffs' common
law failure to warn claims are preempted. ,,152 The First Circuit
summarily dismissed the reasoning of the Ferebee court, which had
141. See, e.g., King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 E2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993);
Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 E2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Wa-
ters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); Papasv. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (lth
Cir. 1991). But see Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 E Supp. 1128, 1134-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that FIFRA is more akin to the 1965 Act in that it does not sweep broadly to pre-
empt most common law claims and that the EPA sets the floor requirements for product
safety); 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000).
142. See infra notes 147-77 and accompanying text.
143. Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762, 1986 W.L. 14925, at *6 (S.D.N.Y
Dec. 17, 1986).
144. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 E2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984).
145. The argument that a manufacturer can change his label to avoid tort damages and
still follow both state and federal law has been dismissed as "sophistry." MacDonald v. Mon-
santo Co., 27 F3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994). But see Ferebee, 736 E2d at 1540.
146. See infra notes 147-77 and accompanying text. See, e.g., King v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 996 E2d 1346 (lst Cir. 1993).




151. Id. at 1349-51; see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.
152. King, 996 F.2d at 1347.
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held that FIFRA did not preempt common law claims,5" noting
that that decision had been made prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Cipollone.15 4 The court next noted that it was not
alone in reaching the conclusion that FIFRA barred state failure to
warn claims,' 55 citing similar decisions in three other U.S. Courts of
Appeal156 since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone.
157
In one of those decisions, Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v.
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 15 remanded the
Tenth Circuit's earlier decision 159 in light of the high court'sS 160
holding in Cipollone. In its pre-Cipollone ruling "Arkansas-Platte I,"
the Tenth Circuit had held that common law actions based on
failure to warn were impliedly preempted under FIFRA.16 1 On
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 136v(b) of FIFRA was just as inclusive as the 1969 Act
considered in Cipollone.16 Relying on FIFRA's statutory language
and on Cipollone,63 the "Arkansas-Platte II" court held that "[t] o the
extent the state tort claims in this case require a showing that
defendants' labeling and packaging should have included
additional, different, or alternatively stated warnings from those
required under FIFRA, they would be expressly preempted."
164
Similarly, in Papas v. Upjohn Co., ("Papas I'),165 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs claims based
on negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability were in reality claims of inadequate labeling as to
the dangers of defendants' product.66 The U.S. Supreme Court
153. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 E2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984); see supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
154. King, 996 E2d at 1349; see generally Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
155. King, 996 F.2d at 1349.
156. The King court noted that its decision to preempt state failure to warn claims was
in accord with three other circuit court decisions: Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517, 520
(11th Cir. 1993); and Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). King, 996 F.2d
at 1349-51.
157. See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
158. Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 506 U.S. 910 (1992).
159. Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.
1992) ("Arkansas-Platte I").
160. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
161. Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 162-63.
162. Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 E2d 1177, 1179 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("Arkansas-Platte II").
163. Seegenerally Cipolone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
164. Arkansas-PlatteII, 981 F.2d at 1179 (emphasis added).
165. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 E2d 1019 (llth Cir. 1991) ("Papas I").
166. Papas I, 926 F2d at 1020.
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remanded the Papas I decision for consideration in light of its de-
cision in Cipollone.161 On remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit also decided that FIFRA expressly preempted all of
plaintiff's claims to the extent they were based on labeling or
packaging."" The court also indicated that a claim of implied war-
ranty of merchantability was a "requirement" imposed by state law
and thus was preempted pursuant to FIFRA to the extent that it
depended on inadequacies in labeling or packaging.' 69 Except as to
the implied warranty of merchantability claim, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not, however, specifically indicate exactly which of
plaintiff's claims were based on labeling or packaging, and thus
which specific claims were preempted by FIFRA.
In Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc.,'" another significant circuit court
decision after Cipollone, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that FIFRA's preemption language was no less broad
than that of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.17 1 In
Shaw, plaintiff was injured when he mixed a bathroom cleaner and
a mildew stain remover, two products labeled with EPA approved
labels. 72 Plaintiff sued defendants in strict liability and negli-
173
gence.
The court noted that FIFRA prohibited states from imposing
"addition[al]" or "different" labeling requirements. 1 74 Noting that
an award of damages would have the effect of imposing "addi-
tion[al]" or "different" labeling requirements, the court held that
FIFRA preempted plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims
based on a failure to warn.175
Other courts in the early to mid-1990's, including most of the
remaining federal circuits, also held that FIFRA preempted most
common law tort actions. 176 These courts reasoned that almost all
167. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
168. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 E2d 516, 517, 520 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Papas II").
169. Papas II, 985 E2d at 519-20.
170. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
171. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
172. Shaw, 994 F.2d at 365.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 371.
175. Id. at 365, 371; see also Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding that claim based on inadequate labeling of log preservative used in home
was preempted by FIFRA); Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that negligent testing, breach of warranty and strict liability claims were all preempted
under FIFRA); Bice v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding preemp-
tion of failure to warn claim); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 E3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that Congress intended FIFRA to preempt common law claims related to label-
ing).
176. See, e.g., Grenier, 96 E3d 559; Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.
1995) (preempting express warranty claims if based on statements required on product
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state tort claims related to labeling in some manner and thus im-
posed additional requirements not permissible under FIFRA.1
7
III. THE NEW CASE LAW: THE PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE BEGINS TO ERODE
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Medtronic v. Lohr' 8
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Medtronic v. Lohr."9
Medtronic is significant because it involved a claim of federal pre-
emption under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (the
"MDA"), and because it involved an interpretation of the word
"requirement" as contained in the MDA.' °
The MDA provides that certain medical devices that are poten-
tially very harmful must undergo a rigorous federal approval
process before they are placed on the market."" Although the de-
vice at issue in Medtronic was potentially subject to such a process,
the MDA provided two important exceptions to the premarket ap-
proval process ("PMA"): first, the MDA allowed pre-1976 devices to
remain on the market until the required PMA was completed; and
second, the MDA allowed new devices which were "'substantially
equivalent'" to existing devices to be sold based on a much more
limited approval process. 8 2 Devices marketed under this limited
form of review as "'substantially equivalent'" to existing devices
label); Taylor, 54 F.3d 555; Bice, 39 F.3d 887; Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 E Supp. 503
(M.D. Tenn. 1993) (preempting all tort claims except those for defective design and failure
to properly test product); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
177. See, e.g., Grenier, 96 F.3d at 565 (preempting negligent design and negligent manu-
facturing claims where plaintiff did not explain how they were different than "disguised"
mislabeling claims); Taylor, 54 F.3d 555 (preempting plaintiff's negligent testing claim, im-
plied warranty claims, and even express warranty claims, where all were based on product
label); Bice, 39 F.3d 887.
178. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
179. Id.
180. Medical Device Amendments (MDA) of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360 et. seq. (1999 &
Supp. 2002).
181. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477.
182. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478. The MDA required a manufacturer claiming that a new
device was substantially similar to an existing device to submit a pre-market notification.
Pursuant to this notification, the FDA would then determine if the device was substantially
equivalent to an existing device. If so, the new device could be sold without further regula-
tory oversight. Id. Because the FDA could not move the new applications through the
rigorous PMA process swiftly, the pre-market notification process "became the means by
which most new medical devices.., were approved for the market." Id. at 479.
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are subject to the requirements of section 360k of the MDA. s13 Sec-
tion 360k of the MDA provides:
State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule
[N] o State or political subdivision of a State may es-
tablish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any re-
quirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the de-
vice or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter.
8 4
In this case, Medtronic took advantage of the "'substantially





In 1990, petitioner Lohr had implanted a Medtronic pacemaker
with a model 401 pacemaker lead. 186 Petitioner suffered a
"'complete heart block'" when the pacemaker lead failed on
December 30, 1990.187 Petitioner Lohr and her husband sued
Medtronic in negligence and strict liability and the manufacturer
claimed that both claims were preempted by Section 360k of the
MDA and regulations promulgated thereunder.
In addressing the petitioner's claims, the Court reviewed gen-
eral preemption doctrine, noting that the Court would not find
preemption in an area of traditional power of the states unless it
was the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress "' s9 to preempt
such powers. The Court again noted that congressional intent was
the driving force in any preemption analysis.90
While guided by the Cipollone9' decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in a four justice plurality opinion that there were
substantial differences between Cipollone and Medtronic, even
though the statutes in both cases prohibited the states from
183. Id. at 478.
184. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (emphasis added).
185. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480 ("The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits
the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the 'pulse generator' to the heart itself.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at481.
188. Id. Pursuant to Section 360k, defendant Medtronic moved for summary judgment.
Id.
189. Id. at 485 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
190. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.
191. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
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imposing additional "requirement[s]" on manufacturers. 1 9 2 The
plurality held that, unlike in Cipollone, the statute here only
preempted state regulations to the extent that the FDA, the agency
responsible for enforcing the MDA, had issued specific regulations
for the device at issue-regulations that the FDA had not yet issued
in this case.1
9 3
The Court further distinguished Cipollone in that there the stat-
ute was very specific. It targeted only requirements "'based on
smoking and health'" and then only those related to the
"'advertising or promotion of any cigarettes.' ,194 In that context,
the Medtronic Court reasoned, giving the word "'requirement'" a
broad meaning only resulted in a narrow preemptive effect.' 95 In
contrast here the word "requirement," if interpreted broadly,
would include all common law claims and would "deprive the
States of any role in protecting consumers from the dangers in-
herent in many medical devices.' 96 Additionally, the Medtronic
Court noted that one of the congressional purposes of the MDA
had been to reign in an industry in need of more, not less, over-
sight, 97 and that a broad interpretation of the MDA's preemptive
scope would not further this legislative goal.'98 In this context, and
lacking any legislative history to support a broad view of federal
preemption under the MDA, the Court held that Congress had
meant to preserve "at least some common-law claims" with the en-
actment of the MDA.19)
Finally, the Medtronic Court discussed the fact that this case dif-
fered from Cipollone in that there, preemption resulted from the
very enactment of the federal statute °.9 In contrast here, Congress
had given the administering agency, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA), a role in determining the extent of federal
preemption. 20' Thus, pursuant to the MDA, federal preemption
would only occur if the FDA had promulgated a specific federal
202requirement as to the device at issue. The Supreme Court noted
that the FDA had not yet passed specific regulations concerning
192. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487-91.
193. Id. at 487.
194. Id. at 488.
195. Id. at 488.
196. Id. at 489.
197. Id. at 491.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 495-96.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 496.
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the pacemaker at issue, but rather the applicable federal regula-
tions were general in nature.0 3 Absent specific regulations as to the
product, the Court held that Florida common law duties would
"parallel" federal requirements and that they were not preempted
as "requirement [s] which [were] . .. different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] .,204
Hence, Medtronic stands for the proposition that, at least under
the MDA, where the federal government has not issued regulations
specific to the product or claim at issue, state tort claims in the un-
regulated area will not be preempted.20 5 Additionally, Medtronic
stands for the broader proposition that "the use of the term 're-
quirement' in FIFRA is not dispositive" as to congressional intent
to preempt state tort claims in an area of the law. Rather, where a
federal law bans additional "requirement [s]" by states, the full im-
port of such a ban must be interpreted in the relevant statutory
context.20 7 The statute at issue in both Cipollone and Medtronic pre-
empted states from imposing additional "requirement[s]": "yet the
Supreme Court determined that state common-law tort actions
were preempted only in the former case 
2" and not in the latter.",2 9
B. Recent Case Developments Regarding FIFRA Preemption
In the wake of Medtronic, the lower courts have understandably
become less certain in their approach to the word "requirement"
as contained within FIFRA.2' 0 Developments in the case law, as well
as the EPA's position in Etcheverry,2" discussed in Part III.B.1. below,
indicate that the groundswell of case law supporting a broad
FIFRA preemption defense may be slowing.212
1. The EPA's Main Arguments in Etcheverry-In Etcheverry, the EPA
argued for the first time that it would be appropriate for a court to
adopt a very narrow view of FIFRA preemption. 12 Pursuant to this
203. Id. at 498.
204. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002) (quoted in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486); see
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495-97.
205. Id. at 496 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
206. Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846, 852 (1999).
207. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 12.
208. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521; Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470.
209. Brown, 985 P.2d at 852; see EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 12.
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; infra notes 234-28 and accompanying
text.
211. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5.
212. Kazanjian, supra note 8.
213. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5.
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view, FIFRA would not preempt most state tort claims. The EPA
asserted that as in all cases of preemption, there exists a presump-
tion against preemption of state regulation,2 '5 and that against this
backdrop, the statute must be considered in its statutory and regu-
latory context.2 16 The original purpose of FIFRA, the EPA asserted,
was to make the statute a comprehensive regulatory regime aimed
at protecting humans and the environment and at creating some
uniformity in labeling.217 This congressional purpose, the EPA pos-
ited, favored a reading of the statute that would be less likely to
cause federal preemption of state tort claims. 18 Indeed, the EPA
argued in Etcheverry, just as was argued in Medtronic, that the allow-
ance of more, not less tort claims, would better further FIFRA's
goals. 9
Moreover, the EPA urged, neither the plain text 2 0 of FIFRA nor
the legislative history evince a congressional intent to abrogate
all or most tort claims. The EPA thus noted that the word
"'requirements' appears seventy-five times in [the text of the stat-
ute] and each time refers only to positive law" enactments, 22 not
tort remedies.223 Citing the rule of statutory construction that
"identical words used in different parts of the same act are in-
tended to have the same meaning,, 224 the EPA urged that Congress
must have meant only to preempt positive law enactments when it
used the word "requirements" in the FIFRA preemption provi-
225sion.
226Similarly, the EPA argued that FIFRA's legislative history also
supports a narrow interpretation of the Act's preemption provision
227such that most tort claims are not preempted. In all of the exten-
sive legislative history on the Act, the EPA noted, there is no
reference to the preemption of state tort claims.22' The EPA urged
214. Id.
215. Id. at 8.
216. Id. at 8-12.
217. Id. at 33-35.
218. Id.
219. Id. In Brown, the court similarly stated that "[t]he broader purpose of FIFRA is to
protect public health, not to shield manufacturers from tort liability." Brown v. Chas. H.
Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846, 853 (1999).
220. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 12-19.
221. See id. at 19-32.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Id. at 14-16.
224. Id. at 14 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)).
225. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000).
226. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 19-32.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 19.
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that it is difficult to believe, as it was in Medtronic, that Congress
would have eliminated most or all of the pesticide industry's tort
liability without a word-especially in an industry that it had de-
termined was in need of more, not less, stringent oversight.
2 2 9
As further evidence of congressional intent in line with a more
limited view of preemption, the EPA noted that Congress provided
for no private right of action under FIFRA.230 This, the EPA main-
tained, is also evidence that Congress intended the existing legal
recourse for plaintiffs injured by pesticides to remain in place.23'
Finally, the EPA asserted that, while it believed its arguments
against broad FIFRA preemption should be heeded, at the very
least, FIFRA does not and could not preempt those actions based
on the efficacy of the product in that the EPA itself does not even
regulate this aspect of pesticide registration. Rather, the EPA has
said that as to efficacy claims-it relies on state tort claims to con-
trol manufacturers' conduct in this area.2 4
2. Significant State Court Decisions-In a number of recent cases,
state courts have relied on Medtronic and/or the EPA's arguments
in Etcheverry to limit the preemption defense in pesticide-related235
cases. These decisions indicate that at the state level, the preemp-
tion defense under FIFRA appears to be eroding.236
The preemption defense was first curtailed by Montana's highest
court in Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, Inc. in December
2000.23' The Montana Supreme Court held-in what has been
called a "major ruling" 3-that plaintiff employees exposed to the
pesticide Dursban in the workplace were not precluded from as-
serting failure to warn claims against the pesticide manufacturer,
229. Id. at 19 n.25. It is worth noting that as to labeling, FIFRA really does not create
the type of rote uniformity that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did in
Cipollone. SeeCox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Rather, under
FIFRA, manufacturers submit proposed product labels every time they plan to market a new
product. Thus, uniformity does not exist under FIFRA for all different products as it did
under Cipollone. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
230. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
231. Id. at 9.
232. The Supreme Court of Montana adopted much of the EPA's arguments against
broad federal preemption under FIFRA in Sleath v. W Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d
1042 (Mont. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001).
233. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 35-44; PR NOTICE 96-4 (1996); see supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
234. See EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 44; supra notes 25-28 and accompanying
text.
235. See infra notes 237-87 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 237-87 and accompanying text.
237. Sleath, 16 P.3d 1042.
238. Montana Supreme Court Overturns Past Decision on Failure-to-Warn Claims, Preemption
by FFRA, ANDREWS Toxic CHEMS. LITIG. REP., Jan. 26, 2001, at 5, 6.
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even where the manufacturer had labeled the product in accord
with federal law. ' 9 In so holding, the Supreme Court of Montana
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic and on
the EPA's arguments in Etcheverry to find that Congress had not
intended to preempt state tort claims under FIFRA.2 40 The court
noted that the legislative history bore no evidence of such an in-
tent, even though "three House and Senate committees devoted 25
days to hearings on proposed pesticide legislation" and "thousands
of pages of transcripts of the hearings and floor debates" exist.
24
1
Moreover, the Montana high court noted that the EPA's interpreta-
tion of FIFRA should be accorded great weight as the
interpretation of the agency entrusted with the enforcement of
FIFRA.242 The Montana Supreme Court recognized the general
presumption against preemption and held that Congress had not
manifested the requisite "'clear and manifest intent'" to preempt
state tort law.23 Rather, Congress had only intended for FIFRA to
preempt direct regulation of pesticide labeling.44 Reasoning in this
manner, the court held that not only did FIFRA not preempt all or
most common law damage actions, but that FIFRA could not be
245
read to preempt any common law damage actions.
On the same day as its holding in Sleath, the Supreme Court of
Montana also revisited an earlier decision it had made in McAlpine
v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., in which the court had addressed FIFRA
preemption in a farmer's failure to warn suit.246 Remarkably, the
241court overruled its earlier holding. Changing their position on
the issue of FIFRA preemption, six out of seven of the judges sit-
ting on the Montana high court joined in an opinion that relied
239. See Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1053.
240. Id. at 1052.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1048 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
243. Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1052 (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610
(1991)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1052; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. 2001) (holding
that plaintiffs' claim against pesticide applicator for failure to communicate information on
pesticide label as approved by EPA was not preempted).
246. FIFRA Does Not Preempt State Common-Law Damage Actions, Montana High Court Says,
ANDREWS Toxic CHEMS. LITIG. RP., Jan. 26, 2001, at 6; McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag.
Co., 16 P.3d 1054 (2000) ("McAlpine II").
247. In a 1997 holding, the court had held that FIFRA preempted failure to warn,
breach of warranty and strict liability claims related to a pesticide's label. McAlpine v.
Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., 947 P.2d 474, 477-80 (1997), rev'd, 16 P.3d 1054, 1060 (1999)
("McAlpine I").
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on Sleath 1 to hold that Congress had not intended FIFRA to ex-
tinguish common law tort claims.2 49 The court went on to find that
because FIFRA does not preempt state common law actions, the
parties could refer to the product label in future proceedings be-
fore the court.5
In another remarkable and recent decision, Geye v. American
Cyanamid Co., a Texas appellate court held that plaintiffs' claims
for breach of express and implied warranties and for strict liability
were not preempted by FIFRA.2s' In Geye, plaintiffs sued American
Cyanamid Company after they mixed together two of defendants'
products, applied the mixture to their crops, and their crops
suffered damage.2 52 The plaintiffs alleged that the label specifically
allowed such mixing and that advertisements marketed the
products for this use. The defendants urged that plaintiffs' claims
were too closely tied to the product label and product advertising
254to survive FIFRA preemption.
The Texas court reviewed some of the pertinent case law in
which other courts had held that FIFRA preempted similar
claims.2" However, the court noted that pursuant to Pesticide Regula-
tion Notice 96-4, the EPA had waived data requirements as to
efficacy issues surrounding pesticides. 256 As the EPA had urged in
Etchevery, 57 the Texas Supreme Court thus agreed with the lower
court that "agriculture [sic] pesticides are 'effectively regulated by
the marketplace.' ,2 5 8 The court went on to hold that because plain-
tiffs' claims were based on the efficacy of defendants' products, an
area in which the EPA does not regulate, they were not preempted
by FIFRA.
259
248. Sleath v. W. Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 814 (2001). The Sleath court relied heavily on Medtronic in its analysis of FIFRA
preemption. See Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1052.
249. McAlpine II, 16 P.3d at 1059-60.
250. Id. at 1060.
251. Am. Cyanamid v. Geye, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002) (affirming Geye v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 32 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App. 2000)).
252. Id. at 23.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also Geye, 32 S.W.3d at 917.
255. American Cyanamid, 79 SW.3d at 28-29.
256. Id. at 28-29; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
257. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 37-43.
258. Geye, 32 S.W.3d at 919 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 27932, 27938 (May 11, 1979) in refer-
ence to PR Notice 96-4); American Cyanamid, 79 S.W.3d at 27; see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
259. American Cyanamid, 79 S.W.3d at 29; see also Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d
1123 (Idaho 1997) (holding that express warranty claims are not preempted); Kawamata
Farms, Inc., v. United Agri Products, 948 P.2d 1055 (Haw. 1997) (holding that claims for
negligence, strict liability and express warranty are not preempted).
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In yet another important FIFRA preemption decision, a mid-
level appellate court in Oregon relied on Medtronic6° to hold that
plaintiff's personal injury claims for failure to warn and breach of
warranty were not preempted by FIFRA.6' In Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly
Company, plaintiffs suffered personal injury and sued for breach of
warranty and failure to warn in connection with defendants' prod-
uct, "Weed and Feed."262 The Oregon appellate court reviewed
holdings from a variety of cases involving FIFRA preemption, not-
ing that many had held that FIFRA preempted common law claims
that were in any way related to labeling requirements. 26 Signifi-
cantly, the court noted that most of these prior cases had been
decided before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Medtronic.264 The
court relied on Medtronic to reiterate the presumption against pre-
emption and the purpose of Congress to be the "'touchstone'" in
any preemption analysis.26 ' The court then held that "[n] othing in
the general purposes of FIFRA suggests that Congress intended to
preempt states from imposing liability for harm caused by the use
of pesticides registered under federal law. ... ,,2166 Instead, the Ore-
gon court noted that the "broader purpose of FIFRA is to protect
public health, not to shield manufacturers from tort liability."
267
Thus, as in Medtronic, the court held that the general tort obliga-
tions imposed here-to warn of the dangers of using potentially
dangerous products-"pose no threat to the regulatory require-
ments imposed by federal law.
26
1
Similarly, two New York mid-level appellate courts have also be-
gun to chip away at the preemption defense, holding that general
tort obligations can exist alongside the regulatory requirements of
FIFRA. 269 In an important ruling in New York's Appellate Division,
Second Department, the state appellate court analyzed the claim
of an employee's son against his mother's employer for failing to
warn of the dangers of ethylene oxide, a chemical used by the em-
ployer and registered by the EPA under FIFRA.2 70 The label warned
260. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
261. Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846,851-52 (Or. App. 1999).
262. Id. at 847.
263. See id. at 849-50.
264. See id. at 851.
265. Id. at 852 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470, 485).
266. Id. at 852.
267. Id. at 853.
268. Id.
269. See Mann v. H.W. Andersen Products, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
Tyler v. Dow Chem. Co., Inc., 683 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
270. Mann, 676 N.YS.2d 658.
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that the gas should not be inhaled; should not come into contact
with eyes, skin or clothing; and should be used with adequate ven-
tilation. vt While pregnant with plaintiff, plaintiff's mother worked
in a factory where she put caps on bottles containing the chemi-
cal. 72 Plaintiffs mother claimed that she was not given any
protective gear, that the ventilation was not adequate, and that
273thus plaintiff was born with physical deformities.
New York's Second Department held that plaintiffs claim for
failure to warn was not preempted by FIFRA.274 In so holding, the
New York appellate court distinguished plaintiffs failure-to-warn
claim from others in which it had ruled that the generic failure of
a manufacturer to warn a consumer of danger from use of a pesti-
cide product was preempted under FIFRA.275 The court boldly
stated that "[t]here are failures to warn and failures to warn."
2 76
The New York court held that this was not the type of state-
imposed obligation to warn typically preempted under FIFRA.277
Rather, this case involved a different type of warning: an em-
ployer's warning to "caution and protect a workplace employee
and, in turn, her fetus, from the dangers of exposure to the raw
material itself, when the employee handles [the product] before it
is packaged for sale and distribution by the defendant."
2 7
And finally, the issue of FIFRA preemption of state common law
actions continues to surface in California.279 In Arnold v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., parents sued pesticide makers and distributors, claiming
that their children were harmed by pesticides sprayed in and
around the family home.2s The plaintiffs alleged that the pesticide
called "Mr. Scott's Do-It-Yourself Pest Control" was defectively de-
signed as it "'failed to perform as safely as an ordinary user would
271. See id. at 659.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 661.
275. See id. at 660.
276. Id. at 661.
277. See alsoAckerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1998) (holding that
plaintiff's implied warranty of merchantability claim was preempted, but negligent design
and testing claims were not preempted under FIFRA; and calling the line between a defec-
tive product and a mislabeled product "razor thin").
278. Mann, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 651; see also Tyler v. Dow Chem. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621
(3d Dept. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's express warranty claims were not preempted where
the appellant exterminating company had made voluntary, affirmative statements to appel-
lees regarding the pesticide application and where the statements formed the basis of the
breach of warranty claim).
279. See Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Sun Val-
ley Packing v. Consep, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that express
warranty and negligence claims are not preempted under FIFRA).
280. Arnold, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
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expect when used in [a] reasonably foreseeable manner.' ,,281 The
California appellate court held that plaintiffs' claims were not akin
to the failure to warn claims typically preempted under FIFRA.2
Rather, plaintiffs had properly stated claims for defective design
when they alleged that the product would not perform safely when
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner.28 3 The court also noted
that although the courts were split on whether claims for breach of
implied warranties of fitness and merchantability were preempted
by FIFRA, this court did not believe that such claims would "create
a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those
mandated by FIFRA;" and that thus they were not preempted by
284federal law. In so holding, the court noted that if FIFRA were to
preempt plaintiffs' common law claims, plaintiffs would have "ab-
solutely no recourse for their injuries, since no private right of
action exists under FIFRA."
28 5
Additionally, the Arnold court discussed the California Supreme
Court's decision in Etcheverry, noting the California high court's
ruling that failure to warn claims are preempted by FIFRA, but
stating that "plaintiffs who believe they have been injured as a re-
sult of exposure to pesticides must proceed under state common
law theories of recovery." 216 In the context of plaintiffs' design de-
fect claims, the court thus cautioned: "should preemption be the
rule and should every action be considered a failure-to-warn claim,
plaintiffs will never recover for injuries they have suffered."
2 S7
3. Significant Federal Court Decisions-As in the state courts,
there are recent significant federal court decisions that indicate a




and thus a change in many federal courts' treatment of tort claims
under FIFRA. 90 For example, in a case of first impression, 9' the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Hawkins v.
Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc. in 1999 that a state claim for negligent failure
281. Id. at 727 (quoting complaint).
282. Id. at 726.
283. Id. at 726-27.
284. Id. at 726, 740.
285. Id. at 726.
286. Id. at 731.
287. Id.; see alsoJeffrey Winograd, California Court Allows Pesticide Lawsuit to Proceed, PES-
TICIDE AND Toxic CHEM. NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, at 1.
288. Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470.
289. EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5, at 5.
290. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999); Lyall v:
Leslie's Poolmart, 984 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
291. Julie Brienza, Plaintiffs Will Benefit from Third Circuit's Rejection of Preemption Argu-
ment, 36 TRIAL 106 Uan. 1, 2000).
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to package in a manner designed to protect against decomposition
of the product did not seek to impose a different packaging
requirement as contravened by FIFRA.2 2
In reaching this holding, the Hawkins court explained that
Medtronic stands for the proposition that only where the administer-
ing agency has "'weighed the competing interests ... [and]
reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing
considerations should be resolved in a particular cases [sic] ...
and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate' are gen-
eral common-law claims preempted."294 The court held that
whereas here plaintiffs labeling claims related to a specific label
required by the EPA and thus were preempted by federal law, 
95
plaintiff's packaging claims did not relate to any specific EPA regu-
lation.2 6 Plaintiff urged, and the Hawkins court agreed, that here,
as in Medtronic, the EPA had not issued specific regulations as to
the packaging of the product.27 Thus, a state tort claim based on
inadequate packaging could not be said to impose a requirement in
"'addition to, or different from'298 federal regulations.",2 9
The Hawkins holding has been described as "a message to
corporations that defend against product liability suits involving
... [FIFRA]: Federal preemption is not as invincible as it may
seem."300 The decision represents the Third Circuit's attempt to
apply Medtronic to make a distinction between claims not
292. Hawkins, 184 F.3d 244.
293. In making its decision, the Third Circuit first noted that there exists a presump-
tion against preemption and that as in any preemption analysis, the intent of Congress
controls. Hawkins, 184 E3d at 248, 253.
294. Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 254 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 501); see also Waering v.
BASF Corp., 146 E Supp. 2d 675, 681 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (employing Medtronic to deny pre-
emption under Hazardous Materials and Transportation Authorization Act).
295. Hawkins, 184 E3d at 252.
296. Id. at 253.
297. Id. at 248, 253-54.
298. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
299. Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248, 253-54; see also Brienza, supra note 291, at 56; see supra
notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
In a case similar to Hawkins, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia relied on Medtronic to hold that FIFRA did not preempt defective design claims
regarding the packaging of chlorine tablets. Lucas v. Bio-Lab, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 51.8,
522-23 (E.D. Va. 2000). Likewise, in Lyall v. Leslie's Poolmart, 984 E Supp. 587 (E.D. Mich.
1997), the federal district court also relied on Medtronic to allow plaintiffs tort claims re-
garding packaging and design defects of chlorine tablets. Id. at 594-95. The court held that
plaintiff's design defect claims as to chlorine tablets, and his negligent design and manufac-
turing of packaging claims were not preempted, but that plaintiffs claims for negligence
and breach of express and implied warranties were preempted. Id. at 591-98.
300. Brienza, supra note 291 at 1-2.
301. See generally Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470.
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preempted and those preempted under FIFRA.302 It illustrates the
difficulties faced by the judiciary in this area and one court's
attempt to carve out an area of state tort law not preempted by
FIFRA.
In another recent case, Johnson v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,303 the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York also
attempted to carve out some exceptions to FIFRA preemption.3 4
The decision is interesting in that it represents a court's distinct
effort to define the limits of the preemption doctrine concerning
manufacturing defect and design claims.0 5
The Johnson court held that plaintiffs injured by defendant's
chemical product could maintain claims for breach of express war-
ranty.306 Additionally, the court held that plaintiffs could maintain
claims for strict liability and for negligent design and testing, as
long as the claims were not based on the defendant's failure to
warn under FIFRA.0 7 However, the court also held that plaintiffs'
implied warranty claims were all preempted because they were
clearly based on the inadequacy of the labels involved.08
In making its decision, the Northern District of New York noted
that while "claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formu-
lating ... are not preempted,"3°9 "[c]laims of misdesign or
mismanufacture which the Court regards as thinly veiled labeling
or failure to warn claims will not stand., 31 The court did not be-
lieve that plaintiffs claims were merely veiled failure to warn
claims preempted by FIFRA.3 1 ' Rather, the court held that plain-
tiffs manufacturing defect claim, alleging that the pesticide
product was "'in a dangerous, defective and unsafe condition"'
when in defendant's possession, was based on "design defect" and
not failure to warn. Under these circumstances, where a plaintiff
302. See Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248, 253-54.
303. Id.
304. Johnson v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 129 E Supp. 2d 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 194. Similarly, the Northern District of New York has stated that a claim for
negligence in the application of a pesticide would not be preempted by FIFRA. Jack v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 97-CV-7012 (JG), 2001 WL 25641 (E.D.N.Y.Jan. 5, 2001).
307. Johnson, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95.
308. Id. at 194.
309. Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Lowe v. Spori-
cidin Int'l, 47 E3d 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (reaffirming the analysis in Worm).
310. Johnson, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 195; see also Grenier v. Vt. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F3d 559,
565-66 (1st Cir. 1996).
311. Johnson, 129£ Supp. 2d at 197.
312. Id.
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has truly alleged a design defect claim, the Johnson court held that
federal law will not preempt such a claim.
In contrast, in Kimmel v. DowElanco, l4 the district court reluc-
tandy held that all of plaintiffs tort claims were preempted
because each of them "'essentially boils down to a claim that the
[defendant's] product labels, which have been approved by the
EPA in accordance with FIFRA, [are inaccurate or inappropri-
ate.]' ,'31 In doing so, however, the Kimmel court indicated its
dissatisfaction with this result in light of Medtronic and the EPA's
316
arguments in Etcheverry. The court openly questioned existing
Ninth Circuit law, which it believed had required the court to dis-
miss plaintiffs state tort claims.1 v The court thus discussed Taylor
AG Industries v. Pure-Gro,1 8 the prior Ninth Circuit case in which
plaintiff sued for damages he sustained using defendant's pesticide
products.319 The Taylor court noted that there, the court had cast all
of plaintiff's claims as failure to warn claims and dismissed them
pursuant to FIFRA .
In so holding, the court urged plaintiff to appeal:
[T] he Court feels obligated to briefly point out some argu-
ments that might support the Ninth Circuit's reconsideration
of whether Taylor should continue to be the rule in this circuit.
First, as noted, the EPA itself has taken the position that
FIFRA does not and should not preempt all state tort actions.
The EPA takes this position based on its interpretations of
FIFRA's language and Congress's intent. Because the EPA is
the agency charged with administering FIFRA, its interpreta-
tions should receive great deference.
Second, since Taylor was decided, the EPA has indicated that
it has exercised its statutory option to waive certain data re-
313. Id.
314. Kimmel v. DowElanco, 64 F. Supp. 2d 939 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The court held that
plaintiffs claims were preempted but declined to decide whether common law actions in
general would impose impermissible "requirement[s]" under FIFRA. In so holding, the
district court opened the door to future claimants, hinting that Ninth Circuit law ought to
be reconsidered. Kimmel, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
315. Kimmel, 64 E Supp. 2d at 944; see supra note 313 and accompanying text; infra note
316 and accompanying text.
316. Kimmel, 64 E Supp. 2d at 944; EPA Etcheverry Brief, supra note 5.
317. Kimmel, 64 E Supp. 2d at 944; see Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th
Cir. 1995).
318. Taylor, 54 E3d 555.
319. Id. at 561-64.
320. Id.
[VOL. 36:2
Federal Preemption of Tort Claims Under FFRA
quirements under FIFRA. As the EPA argues in its amicus
brief to the California Supreme Court, the fact that the EPA
has waived consideration of certain matters should alter the
preemption analysis. 2 '
Bound by Taylor, the Kimmel court thus held that FIFRA pre-
empted plaintiffs strict liability claims, plaintiffs negligent design
and testing claims and all of plaintiffs warranty claims. 22
Five years after Tazylor and in the wake of Kimmel, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently reached an intriguing decision in Ruiz-Guzman v.
Amvac Chemical Corp.:3 In that case, plaintiffs were employees at an
orchard that used a pesticide called Phosdrin, manufactured by
defendant Amvac Chemical Corporation and distributed by de-
fendant Wilbur-Ellis Company.2 4 Plaintiffs alleged that they were
harmed by exposure to the pesticide and they brought actions for
defective design .3  The Ninth Circuit held that pursuant to an
opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington on the matter, a
manufacturer of a product could be strictly liable for injuries
caused by the product if it was not "reasonably safe as designed."0
2 6
Under Washington law, a plaintiff seeking to show that a product is
not "reasonably safe as designed" must do so under the "'risk-
utility' test" or the "'consumer expectation' test." 27 While the
Ninth Circuit thus held that FIFRA would preempt any claim that
would "require the manufacturer to change the product label in
order to avoid liability, 32 the circuit court held FIFRA would not
preempt a design defect claim under the "'risk utility' test." How-
ever, without any further explanation, the Ninth Circuit also held
that plaintiffs claim of design defect based on Washington law's
"'consumer expectation' test" would not survive FIFRA preemp-
tion. 29
321. Kimmel, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 944; see Taylor, 54 F.3d at 561-64; see supra note 313 and accompanying text.
323. Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., No. 98-35088, 2000 WL 1763212 (9th Cir.
Nov. 28, 2000); see supra note 313 and accompanying text.
324. Ruiz-Guzman, 2000 WL 1763212, at *1.
325. Id. Plaintiffs also brought claims for "negligent failure to train." The Washington
high court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment on these claims because





329. Id. at *1-2. The Supreme Court of Washington held that a manufacturer could es-
cape liability in tort for a product that was an "'unavoidably unsafe product,'" if it could
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C. Summary
The above-described recent federal cases,30 like their state coun-
terparts,3 3 1 demonstrate a change in the judiciary's view of federal
preemption under FIFRA and indicate that the FIFRA preemption
defense appears to be eroding. The cases present a stark contrast
to the cases of the early 1990's-wherein many courts held that
FIFRA preempted most common law tort actions -and aptly
demonstrate that, at a minimum, the judiciary has tended to sway
and bend on the issue of federal preemption under FIFRA.3
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD CLARIFY THE EXTENT OF
THE INTENDED PREEMPTION UNDER FIFRA AND
FIFRA SHOULD BE INTERPRETED NARROWLY
A. FFRA's Preemption Provision Should
Be Interpreted Narrowly
FIFRA should be interpreted narrowly so that it does not pre-
empt state tort actions. Such an interpretation would be in line
with the requisite presumption against federal preemption of state
law and the actual text of the statute which does not expressly
preempt state tort actions.33 5 Allowing a narrow interpretation so
that the Act does not shield pesticide users and makers from tort
liability will economically motivate pesticide makers and users to
increase the safety of pesticide products.3 6 Such an interpretation
would thus be in keeping with a major purpose of Congress in
passing FIFRA: to make pesticide use and sale safer for humans
and the environment. 33 7 Moreover, interpreting FIFRA to preempt
show factually that 
"
'its utility greatly outweighs the risks posed by its use.'" Id. (quoting
Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem Corp., 7 P.3d 795,804 (Wash. 2000).
330. See supra Part III.B.3.
331. See supra Part III.B.2.
332. See supra notes 140-77 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 140-77 and accompanying text, and Parts III.B.2-3.
334. Sleath v. W. Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042, 1052 (Mont. 2000)
(quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991); EPA Etcheverry Brief,
supra note 5, at 8.
335. See7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000).
336. Cf Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846,853 (1999).
337. Brown, 985 P.2d at 853; see supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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little or no state tort action would also be in line with the viewpoint
of the agency charged with its primary enforcement-the EPA.338
B. Congress Should Clarify FFRA's Preemption Provision
FIFRA's preemption provision cries out for legislative
clarification. 339 Beginning in the 1980's, the courts were clear that
section 136v of FIFRA was not intended to preempt state common
law actions. 340 The pendulum swung the other way in the 1990's
with decisions like Papas f4' and Arkansas-Platte f 42 in which the
courts held that most pesticide claims, if even remotely related to
the labeling of the product, were preempted by FIFRA 3  The tide
appears to be changing again as some courts have begun to hold
344that FIFRA does not preempt state tort actions or have tried to
carve out exceptions to FIFRA preemption. In any event, vastly
different approaches to FIFRA preemption have been taken by the
judiciary over the years. 46 Such inconsistent application will only
frustrate the purposes of FIFRA-to create national uniformity of
standards and to protect humans and the environment. 34 Congress
should step in to clarify the intended preemptive effect of FIFRA




FIFRA is a comprehensive statute designed to make pesticide
use safer for humans and the environment. FIFRA contains a fed-
eral preemption provision which specifically prohibits states from
338. See supra Part III.B.1.
339. See Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 993
P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
340. See supra notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
341. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11 th Cir. 1991).
342. Ark.-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.
1992).
343. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Sleath v. W. Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (2000).
345. See supra Parts III.B.2-3.
346. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text, and Parts III.B.2-3.
347. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text; supra Parts III.B.2-3.
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imposing "additional" or "different" labeling requirements, but it
is unclear exactly whether Congress intended to preempt all or any
state tort actions with this provision.
In interpreting FIFRA's provision on state authority, which pro-
hibits a state imposition of additional or different labeling
requirements, the majority of courts have held that state tort law
actions are preempted to varying degrees. These courts have rea-
soned that while the statute gives states some power to regulate
pesticide sale and use, imposing state tort law remedies on pesti-
cide manufacturers amounts to imposing additional labeling
requirements in contravention of FIFRA's mandate to refrain from
doing so.
Recent developments in the case law and a change in the EPA's
position on FIFRA preemption call these past decisions into ques-
tion. In Etcheverry, the EPA-the federal agency administering
FIFRA-urged that FIFRA does not preempt state tort actions at
all. The EPA posited that neither the legislative history nor the
plain text of the Act called for FIFRA to preempt state tort actions.
And in Medtronic, the Supreme Court held that the barring of addi-
tional "requirements" by states pursuant to the Medical Device
Amendments Act did not preempt state tort actions. Additionally,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Medtronic that state actions are not
preempted where the federal government has not chosen to regu-
late the conduct at issue with specific regulations. In the wake of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic in 1996, and on the
basis of the EPA's position in Etcheverry in 2000, many courts have
decided that allowing certain tort actions to stand does not
amount to imposing additional requirements on pesticide makers
and have begun to limit or eliminate federal preemption under
FIFRA.
Whether these more recent decisions are an indication that the
groundswell for a narrow interpretation of FIFRA has begun re-
mains to be seen. At the very least, these court decisions-so vastly
different from earlier decisions in this area of the law-indicate
that clarification of FIFRA's preemption provision is needed.
Whether this clarification will come from the U.S. Supreme Court
or from Congress remains to be seen.
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